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ABSTRACT 
It is very hard to generate a set of criteria to separate preparatory 
from executive acts. This fact can be considered as a necessity. At the 
same time this also reflects the vulnerability of the legality principle. The 
distinction between preparatory acts and the executive acts is one of the 
most controversial issues in modern criminal law. In Turkish Penal Code, 
the sole criterion regarding the beginning of executive acts is reflected in 
Art. 35 which states”A person who (directly) acts”. This in fact is not a clear 
formulation and unable to answer the question of when exactly the 
executive acts start. Therefore, the Turkish courts, especially the Supreme 
Court (Yargıtay), are inspiring from the Turkish doctrine which takes 
advantages of various theories below, adopts and updates new measures 
and criteria to separate preparatory acts from executive ones. 
Keywords: Attempt, Turkish Penal Code Article 35, Distinction, 
Executive Acts, Preparatory Acts, 
INTRODUCTION 
If we consider that a crime is committed in a pathway called iter 
criminis, it can be said that the offender follows four stages. The first 
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stage is thinking. The offender thinks to commit a crime. In the 
second stage, the offender performs some preparatory acts in 
conformity with his thinking. These acts aim the consequence. In the 
third stage, the offender performs executive acts, again in conformity 
with his thinking, and these acts are able to cause the consequence 
and better reflect the intention of the offender to commit crime than 
preparatory acts. At the end, the consequence occurs. 
In case of attempt, the consequence does not result in the last 
stage, and therefore iter criminis is not over. In such a case, we shall talk 
about an inchoate crime and we refer to attempt to commit a crime. 
In this article, we review the first indictable stage of crime in 
Turkish Criminal Law. It needs a distinction between the preparation 
and execution of crime. According to the formulation of the justification 
of Art. 35 within the Turkish Penal Code, preparatory acts cannot be 
punished. However, there are no descriptions for either preparatory or 
executive acts in Turkish law and also no statement regarding when the 
executive acts begin. This question is solved based on the opinions in 
doctrine and interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
We first present general information about the regulation of 
attempt in Turkish Penal Code which is applicable to all convenient 
crimes and deal with the conditions of attempt correspondingly with 
our issue. Then, we review executive acts under the titles of theories 
on distinction between preparatory and executive acts and last we 
refer to Turkish Practice. 
I. ATTEMPT 
Attempt is regulated in Art. 35 of Turkish Penal Code. The first 
paragraph of the article regulates the conditions required for an 
attempt, and the second one regulates the punitive sanctions for 
attempt to commit a crime. Article 35 of Turkish Penal Code is read as; 
“(1) A person, who (directly1) acts with the intention of committing a 
crime but fails to perform the acts necessary to commit the crime due to a 
cause beyond his control, is considered to have attempted to commit crime. 
                                                            
1 The word (directly) is added to text by us to prevent the Turkish expression loss 
in translation 
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(2) In case of attempt to commit a crime, the offender is sentenced to 
imprisonment from thirteen years to twenty years instead of heavy life 
imprisonment according to the seriousness of the damage or danger; and 
imprisonment from nine years to fifteen years instead of life imprisonment. In 
other cases, the punishment is abated from one-fourth up to three-fourth.”2 
This provision is a general regulation which is applicable to all 
convenient crimes since “attempt” is regulated within the general 
part of the Turkish Penal Code. 
Now we analyze the conditions of attempt in Turkish law 
inspired from this article. 
A. Conditions of Attempt 
The first condition refers to the “mens rae” aspect of attempt. It 
means that as an essential ingredient of attempt, the offender must 
have the criminal intention to commit a crime. Offender solely 
attempts to commit a crime with a criminal intent. This also implies 
that no one can attempt to commit a negligent crime.3 
We shall touch upon the subject of dolus eventualis (possible mali-
ce). Article 21 of Turkish Penal Code states that “execution of an act by 
the offender being aware of its possible results is considered as dolus 
eventualis.”4 Within the Turkish doctrine, some of the writers claim that 
the crimes with dolus eventualis are fit to attempt to commitment.5 
However, the widely-accepted view states that these crimes are not fit 
to attempt to commitment. The Turkish Supreme Court also agrees 
with the second group of writers and their opinion.6 
                                                            
2 The Ministry of Justice, Turkish Penal Code (English Version),  
 http://www.justice.gov.tr/basiclaws/Criminal_Code.pdf (Online 14.10.2014) 
3 Mahmut Koca – İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 7. Baskı, 
Ankara, 2014, p. 391; Mehmet Emin Artuk – Ahmet Gökçen – Ahmet Caner Yeni-
dünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 7. Baskı, Ankara, 2013, p.558 
4 Supra Note 1 
5 Bahri Öztürk, Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Uygulamalı Ceza Hukuku ve Emniyet 
Tedbirleri Hukuku, 9. Baskı, Ankara, 2006, kn. 297; Adem Sözüer, Suça Teşeb-
büs, İstanbul, 1994, p. 165 
6 Turkish Supreme Court (Yargitay) 1st Criminal Section, Decision No: 2008/6351, 
Date: 31.07.2008 
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Another condition of attempt refers to performance of 
convenient act(s).7 Likewise Art. 35/1 includes the words of “…fails to 
perform the acts necessary to commit the crime…” 
The justification of the Art. 35 points out the same condition and 
states that materials used in the commission of criminal offenses 
should be suitable for the feasance stipulated in the legal definition of 
the crime.8 In terms of convenience, the acts should also be suitable to 
commit the crime. Therefore, convenience is binding both in terms of 
the performed acts and used materials. 
Another condition of attempt is explained with the following 
statement: “a crime with consequence must exist”9. Fulfilment of this 
condition is derived from the nature of the attempt. In Turkish Penal 
Code, some of the crimes are regulated as sheer act crimes or crimes 
of adjacent act to consequence.10 Such examples include threat crime, 
aspersion crime or defamation crime. In these crimes, the offender 
performs the act stipulated in the legal definition of the crime, and at 
the same time the consequence occurs. For example offender uses the 
insulting words to the victim of defamation crime. It is not necessary 
to observe a consequence after the commission of the act. Yet others 
argue that there is a consequence even in such crimes and that 
consequence occurs instantly.11 
It should be noted that if the sheer act(s) may be separated the 
sections, in such a case it would be possible to attempt the sheer act 
crime.12 For example offender intends to insult someone by letter. The 
letter can be seized by the police at the post office. So in such a case, 
we shall consider that offender attempted to defamation crime. 
                                                            
7 Mahmut Koca – İlhan Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 398; 
Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.570 
8 Adalet Bakanlığı, Türk Ceza Kanunu Madde Gerekçeleri,  
 www.ceza-bb.adalet.gov.tr/mevzuat/maddegerekce.doc(Online 15.10.2014) 
9 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.572 
10 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.247 
11 Hakan Hakeri, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 14. Baskı, Ankara, 2012, p. 148 
12 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.572 
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As another condition for attempt, the consequence should not 
occur. This is also indicated in Art. 35 which states “…but fails …to 
commit the crime due to a cause beyond his control” 
Consequence must be unaccomplished due to a cause beyond the 
offender’s control. In case the offender voluntarily abandons 
performing the acts necessary to commit the crime or avoids 
accomplishment of the crime with his own efforts, then he may not be 
punished for this crime; however, where the accomplished part 
constitutes an offense, punishment is given only for this specific offense. 
In that case we consider voluntary abandonment instead of attempt.13 
The last and the most important condition for attempt is that the 
performed acts must be in nature of executive acts.14 As mentioned 
before, offender follows a crime path called iter criminis. After 
thinking about committing a crime, the offender makes some 
preparations which aim to accomplish the consequence. Then s/he 
performs some acts which are able to accomplish the crime. 
II. INDICTABLE ACTS 
According to the justification of the Art. 35, preparatory acts 
cannot be punished. In Turkish law there are no certain and clear 
measures which distinguish between preparatory and executive acts. 
Turkish doctrine and courts rely on general and international 
theories on describing the preparatory and the executive acts.15 
A. Theories on the distinction between preparatory and 
executive acts 
Theories about the separation of preparatory and executive acts 
can be classified in three groups. These include subjective theories 
                                                            
13 Koca – Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 401 ff; Artuk – Gökçen – 
Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 574 ff 
14 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.561 ff; Koca – 
Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 392 ff 
15 For further information Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p.194 ff; Doğan Soyaslan Teşeb-
büs Suçu, İstanbul, 1994, p. 65 ff 
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(obviously expressed malice theory, theory abiding by offenders 
plan), objective theories (time sequence -chronological- theory, formal 
and substantive objective theory, expressive act theory) and hybrid 
theories.16 
Subjective theories are further divided into two branches. These 
theories consider the intention of the offender. 
“Obviously expressed malice theory” is the first one. Haelschner, 
Bockelmann from Germany, Hafter from Switzerland, Garraud, 
Vidal-Magnol from France, Garofalo from Italy maintain the 
theory.17According to theory, the executive acts are the acts which 
express the offender’s malice certainly and undoubtedly.18 
Other branch of the subjective theories is the “theory abiding by 
offenders plan”. Hans Welzel maintains the theory. In his opinion 
according to offenders’ plan(s) attempt starts with the activities 
directly targeting to accomplish the legal definition of the crime.19 
Preparatory acts or executive acts can, therefore, be found out from 
the offenders’ plan.20 
Objective theories do not consider malice but the act and distance 
between the act and the consequence, and the essential character of 
the act.21 
First group of writers of objective theories maintain “time 
sequence (chronological) theory”.22 According to Petrocelli, Scarano 
and Massari, who maintain this theory, those acts that are distal (far 
acts) to the consequence are considered as preparatory acts, whereas 
closer acts are viewed as executive acts. Proceeding from this 
                                                            
16 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.564 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, Koca – Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 395 
19 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p.565 
20 Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p. 203; Koca – Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel 
Hükümler, p. 395 
21 Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p. 194 ff, Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku 
Genel Hükümler, p. 566, Sulhi Dönmezer, Teşebbüste Hazırlık ve İcra Hareket-
leri Tefriki, İÜHFM, C.:VIII, İstanbul, 1942, p.440 ff 
22 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 566 
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expression they make a distinction between distal attempt and closed 
attempt.23 
One other group of objective theories is formal and substantive 
objective theory. The supporters of the formal objective theory argue 
that the executive acts which are stipulated in the legal definition of 
the crime.24 As a result, executive acts start when the legally 
stipulated acts start. The acts before these acts are regarded as 
preparatory acts.25 According to assertors of substantive objective 
theory, executive acts refer to those acts which necessarily and 
naturally depend on the feasance in the legal definition of the crime.26 
Last objective theory is “expressive act theory”. Carrara from Italy 
maintains this theory.27 According to theory, the executive act is the 
act which expresses the offender’s malice without giving rise to 
confusion.28 While executive acts express the offender’s malice to 
commit a specific crime, preparatory acts express the offender’s 
intention to undefined legal or illegal aims.29 
The last groups of theories are the hybrid theories of subjective 
and objective theories. In doctrine there are too many hybrid theories 
put forward in different nature.30 
B. Turkish Practice 
The Turkish doctrine, as well as the Turkish Supreme Court, 
adopts hybrid or combined theories in principle. In Dönmezer-
Erman’s opinion, being in favor of an hybrid approach on the 
                                                            
23 Ibid 
24 Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p. 194 ff 
25 Ibid, Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 566, Koca 
– Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 394 
26 Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p. 197, Koca – Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel 
Hükümler, p. 394, Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hüküm-
ler, p. 566, 
27 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 567. 
28 Sulhi Dönmezer, Teşebbüste Hazırlık ve İcra Hareketleri Tefriki, p. 448. 
29 Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 568 
30 Sözüer, Suça Teşebbüs, p. 206 ff; Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku 
Genel Hükümler, p. 569 
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distinction between preparatory and executive acts is essential 
because of the necessity to keep balance between defining the borders 
of individual freedom and not to draw conclusions contrary to the 
clear provisions of the penal law.31 
According to Toroslu, none of the above-mentioned theories are 
suitable to solve the problem. The solution will be found with the 
judge’s assessment with common sense and satisfactory knowledge. 
In each concrete case, taking advantage of all these theories, the judge 
researches the question of “does offender express his intention to 
commit a crime?” and “is the protected legal value thrown hazard”. 
In this way, s/he decides whether the acts are preparatory or 
executive acts.32 
In Turkish Penal Code, the sole criterion regarding the start of 
the executive acts are reflected in the words “A person who (directly) 
acts”.This is not a clear formulation and is unable to answer the 
question of when exactly the executive acts start. 
It should be noted that there is no legal formulation of executive 
acts in Turkish law. The justification of penal code formulates that 
“preparatory acts cannot be punished”. This is an inexplicit criteria 
on beginning of executive acts Although the justification of the penal 
code explains this formulation by stating that the offender will be 
punished after he directly starts to commit executive acts, it does not 
give a clear formulation when the executive acts starts. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions can be considered as the most important 
guide on this issue. However, it should also be noted that these 
decisions are peculiar for specific reviewed cases. 
According to the formulation of the Art. 35, descriptions in the 
justification of this article and opinions in doctrine, we can say that 
the executive acts starts when the offender starts performing the acts 
in the basic or aggravated form of legal definition of the crime. 
Nonetheless if the legal definition of crime includes a consequence as 
                                                            
31 Sulhi Dönmezer – Sahir Erman, Nazari ve Tatbiki Ceza Hukuku Genel Kısım, 
C.:1, 12. Baskı, İstanbul, 1997, p. 568 
32 Nevzat Toroslu, Ceza Hukuku Genel Kısım, Ankara, 2005, p.261 
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a primary matter to commit that crime, the executive acts are the acts 
which necessarily depend on the feasance.33 
CONCLUSION 
Attempt is regulated under the Art. 35 of Turkish Penal Code. 
The first paragraph of the article regulates the conditions for the 
attempt whereas the second one regulates the punitive sanctions of 
attempt to commit a crime. 
According to the provisions of the Art. 35, attempt to commit a 
crime has a number of essential conditions. First one is the criminal 
intention to commit a crime (dolus directus). Second, convenient act or 
acts must be performed. As a third condition, a crime with 
consequence must exist. The last condition is the most important one 
for our issue and states that performed acts must be in nature of the 
executive acts. 
In Turkish law there are no certain and clear measures or criteria 
describing the distinction between preparatory acts and executive 
acts. The Turkish doctrine and the courts rely on general and 
international theories for describing the preparatory and the 
executive acts. We can say that Turkish doctrine and courts adopt 
hybrid theories to generate measures and criteria to distinguish 
between preparatory and executive acts. 
On the other hand, this generation process goes on in its nature 
since entry into effect of Turkish Penal Code No. 5237. This is mainly 
because there is no legal formulation of the executive acts within the 
Turkish law. This calculated space is estimated to be filled by 
Supreme Court’s interpretation. The solution to the question of 
distinction between preparatory and executive acts will be found 
with the judge’s assessment in each concrete case, taking advantages 
of all theories mentioned above. 
                                                            
33 İzzet Özgenç, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 8. Bası, Ankara, 2013, p. 447; 
Artuk – Gökçen – Yenidünya, Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 570; Koca – 
Üzülmez, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, p. 397; Hakan Hakeri, Ceza 
Hukuku Genel Hükümler, 14. Baskı, Ankara, 2012, p. 422 ff; Turkish Supreme 
Court (Yargıtay) Penal Plenary Session, Decision No: 2012/209, Date 22.05.2012. 
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